im_server/server/login_lockout.go

package main

import (
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/tinode/chat/server/logs"
	"github.com/tinode/chat/server/store"
	"github.com/tinode/chat/server/store/types"
)

// loginAuditRiskActionLocked marks failure-log rows recorded at the moment the
// account lockout is triggered; the admin console uses it to offer unlocking.
const loginAuditRiskActionLocked = "account_locked"

// loginLockoutAccount extracts the account name supplied with a basic-auth secret.
func loginLockoutAccount(secret []byte) string {
	parts := strings.SplitN(string(secret), ":", 2)
	if len(parts) != 2 || strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) == "" {
		return ""
	}
	return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]))
}

// tenantLoginRateLimitPolicy loads the published login rate limit policy for
// the tenant. Any error or disabled policy yields ok=false (feature off, the
// login flow then behaves exactly as before).
func tenantLoginRateLimitPolicy(tenantCode string) (types.LoginRateLimitPolicy, bool) {
	if strings.TrimSpace(tenantCode) == "" {
		return types.LoginRateLimitPolicy{}, false
	}
	policy, err := store.ModerationConfig.SecurityPolicy(tenantCode)
	if err != nil {
		if !errors.Is(err, types.ErrUnsupported) {
			logs.Warn.Printf("login lockout policy load failed tenant:%s err:%v", tenantCode, err)
		}
		return types.LoginRateLimitPolicy{}, false
	}
	return policy.LoginRateLimit.Normalized()
}

// loginLockedMessage renders the user-facing lockout message: sub-minute
// remainders are reported as "within 1 minute", sub-hour as "within 1 hour",
// sub-day rounded down to whole hours, otherwise rounded down to whole days.
// A non-positive remaining time (e.g. the lock already expired while rendering)
// falls back to a generic message instead of a misleading duration.
func loginLockedMessage(retryAfter time.Duration) string {
	const fallback = "登录错误次数过多，账号已锁定，请稍后再试或联系管理员"
	if retryAfter <= 0 {
		return fallback
	}
	prefix := "登录错误次数过多，账号已锁定，请 "
	switch {
	case retryAfter < time.Minute:
		return prefix + "1 分钟以内再试"
	case retryAfter < time.Hour:
		return prefix + "1 小时以内再试"
	case retryAfter < 24*time.Hour:
		return fmt.Sprintf("%s%d 小时后再试", prefix, int(retryAfter.Hours()))
	default:
		return fmt.Sprintf("%s%d 天后再试", prefix, int(retryAfter.Hours())/24)
	}
}

// loginLockoutGuard enforces the configured login failure lockout for one
// login attempt of the "basic" scheme. A nil guard means the feature is not
// applicable (non-basic scheme, unknown tenant, or disabled policy).
type loginLockoutGuard struct {
	session     *Session
	account     string
	accountHash string
	policy      types.LoginRateLimitPolicy
}

func newLoginLockoutGuard(s *Session, scheme string, secret []byte) *loginLockoutGuard {
	if s == nil || !s.tenantID.IsValid() || strings.TrimSpace(s.tenantCode) == "" ||
		!strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(scheme), "basic") {
		return nil
	}
	account := loginLockoutAccount(secret)
	if account == "" {
		return nil
	}
	policy, ok := tenantLoginRateLimitPolicy(s.tenantCode)
	if !ok {
		return nil
	}
	return &loginLockoutGuard{session: s, account: account, accountHash: hashLoginAccount(account), policy: policy}
}

// preCheck rejects the attempt up front when the account is currently locked,
// without comparing the password.
func (g *loginLockoutGuard) preCheck() (time.Duration, bool) {
	rec, err := store.LoginLockouts.Get(g.session.tenantID, g.accountHash)
	if err != nil {
		if !errors.Is(err, types.ErrNotFound) && !errors.Is(err, types.ErrUnsupported) {
			logs.Warn.Printf("login lockout pre-check failed tenant:%d account_hash:%s err:%v", g.session.tenantID, g.accountHash, err)
		}
		return 0, false
	}
	now := time.Now()
	if rec.LockedUntil == nil || !now.Before(*rec.LockedUntil) {
		return 0, false
	}
	return time.Until(*rec.LockedUntil), true
}

// recordFailure counts one failed password attempt and, when the configured
// threshold is reached, persists the lock. It returns the remaining lock time
// and whether the account is now locked.
func (g *loginLockoutGuard) recordFailure() (time.Duration, bool) {
	now := time.Now()
	cutoff := now.Add(-time.Duration(g.policy.WindowSeconds) * time.Second)
	rec, err := store.LoginLockouts.RecordFailure(g.session.tenantID, g.accountHash, nil, cutoff, now)
	if err != nil {
		if !errors.Is(err, types.ErrUnsupported) {
			logs.Warn.Printf("login lockout record failed tenant:%d account_hash:%s err:%v", g.session.tenantID, g.accountHash, err)
		}
		return 0, false
	}
	if rec.FailedAttempts < g.policy.PasswordMaxAttempts {
		return 0, false
	}
	until := now.Add(time.Duration(g.policy.LockSeconds) * time.Second)
	if rec.LockedUntil != nil && rec.LockedUntil.After(now) {
		// Lock already active (e.g. recorded within the same window): keep it.
		until = *rec.LockedUntil
	} else if err = store.LoginLockouts.Lock(g.session.tenantID, g.accountHash, until, now); err != nil {
		if !errors.Is(err, types.ErrUnsupported) {
			logs.Warn.Printf("login lockout persist failed tenant:%d account_hash:%s err:%v", g.session.tenantID, g.accountHash, err)
		}
		return 0, false
	}
	return time.Until(until), true
}

// clear resets the counter after a successful password check.
func (g *loginLockoutGuard) clear() {
	if err := store.LoginLockouts.Reset(g.session.tenantID, g.accountHash); err != nil &&
		!errors.Is(err, types.ErrNotFound) && !errors.Is(err, types.ErrUnsupported) {
		logs.Warn.Printf("login lockout reset failed tenant:%d account_hash:%s err:%v", g.session.tenantID, g.accountHash, err)
	}
}